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THE ANTI-SPOOFING STATUTE:
VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THE
"HYPOTHETICALLY LEGITIMATE
TRADER"
CATRIONA COPPLER*
New technology has made it easier for commodity traders to place
larger trades faster. However, this rise in high frequency trading has
resulted in an increase in market manipulation tactics. Recently, many
traders have adopted manipulative strategies such as spoofing.
Spoofing involves placing an order with intent to cancel the order
before execution. Armed with the new anti-spoofing statute in the 2010
Dodd-Frank Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank Act"), the government has cracked down on all trading
activity that "is, is of the character of or is commonly known to the
trade as 'spoofing. "' However, as the number of spoofing cases
increase, many traders still fear that the anti-spoofing statute is
impermissibly vague. Specifically, the broad-blanket provision that
prohibits trading that "is of the character of' spoofing could
encompass many legitimate trading activities. Additionally, the
definition of spoofing itself is problematic because it does not explicitly
state when the intent to cancel the order must arise.
In the first criminal spoofing case, United States v. Coscia, a district
court held that the anti-spoofing statute was not impermissibly vague as
applied to the defendant. This new precedent established that spoofing
is not impermissibly vague in specific situations in which the intent to
cancel is clearly manifest. In light of this decision, this Comment
explores whether there are still situations in which the anti-spoofing
statute remains impermissibly vague.
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This Comment begins by exploring the history of spoofing and the birth
of the anti-spoofing statute. In doing so, it examines the impact that
spoofing has on financial markets and business in general. It then
explores those situations in which the anti-spoofing statute may still be
considered impermissibly vague and recommends that the "is of the
character of' language of the anti-spoofing statute be removed and that
a new definition of spoofing be adopted.
Introduction ................................................................................................ 262
II. The Creation and Evolution of the Anti-Spoofing Statute and Why
It M atters ......................................................................................... 265
A. A Look Back in Time: Spoofing Pre-Dodd-Frank Act .............. 265
B . Spoofing Today .......................................................................... 266
C. The First Criminal Spoofing Conviction: United States v.
C o scia ...................................................................................... 26 8
D. Spoofing's Impact on Financial Markets and Business ............. 268
III. The Anti-Spoofing Statute is Still Impermissibly Vague in Many
C ontexts .......................................................................................... 272
A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine ............................................. 272
i. Statutes Deemed Impermissibly Vague ................................ 273
ii. The R ule of Lenity ............................................................... 276
iii. Void for Vagueness Doctrine, the Rule of Lenity, and
C o scia ................................................................................. 277
B. How the Anti-Spoofing Statute is Impermissibly Vague ........... 278
i. Fill or K ill O rders ..... : ........................................................... 281
ii. P in gin g ................................................................................. 282
IV. How to Resolve the Issue of Vagueness .............................................. 284
A. Eliminate the "is of the character of' Part of the Anti-
Spoofing Statute ....................................................................... 284
B. A Better Definition of Spoofing ................................................. 284
C. What this Narrower Definition of Spoofing Would Mean for
B u sin ess ................................................................................... 2 87
D. Change is Hard; Reform Is Unlikely .......................................... 289
C onclusion ................................................................................................. 289
INTRODUCTION
The launch of the world's first electronic securities market in 1969
marked the beginning of the transition to electronic markets.1 Since that
time, more markets have become electronic, and technology has vastly
1. Adam Adler, High Frequency Regulation: A New Model for Market
Monitoring, 39 VT. L. REV. 161, 163 (2014).
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improved. Every day, billions of trades are being placed worldwide
through algorithmic computer trading programs. 2 As a result, traders seek
to gain the upper hand by creating more sophisticated and faster computer
programs to not only collect and analyze market data but also to place large
trades at speeds that were once inconceivable. No longer does it take over
a week to complete a trade; today, one can conduct a trade in as little as ten
microseconds.3
Unfortunately, as is the case with most technological innovation, these
computer programs not only facilitate high frequency trading ("HFT"), but
they also enable abusive trading practices.4 In fact, many HFT strategies
rely on market manipulation. 5  One such form of market manipulation
thrust into the spotlight as a result of HFT is spoofing.6 Regulators have
taken note and warn that they will not tolerate spoofing.7
The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") defines spoofing as "bidding or
offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution." 8
However, spoofing can most easily be explained through the following
example. 9 In hypothetical Market A, the current market price is $10 per
share. Trader C places an order in Market A to buy 100 shares at $9 per
share. However, because this is below the current market price, no one is
willing to sell at such a low price, and as a result, Trader C's order does not
execute. But, this non-transaction is not the end of the story because
Trader C is a seasoned trader and has a few (illegal) tricks up his sleeve.
2. Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the
Flash Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1458 (2012) (stating algorithmic trading
accounts for sixty to seventy percent of daily trades on today's U.S. financial
exchanges); see also Adler, supra note 1, at 164 (stating markets today have a daily
volume exceeding one billion orders).
3. Adler, supra note 1, at 163.
4. Id. at 167.
5. Id.
6. Matthew Leising, Oystacher Gets a Second Spoofing Fine, This Time From
ICE, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-06-09/igor-oystacher-gets-a-second-spoofing-fine-this-time-from-ice (explaining
that spoofing has garnered new scrutiny as "lightning-fast electronic trading" makes it
easier to spoof).
7. See Gregory Meyer, CFTC Accuses 3Red Trading of 'Spoofing' Markets, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/cb98026a-767c- 11 e5-
933d-efcdc3cl lc89.html#axzz45R1RqIT4 (quoting Aitan Goelman, CFTC Director of
Enforcement saying, "[s]poofing seriously threatens the integrity and stability of
futures markets because it discourages legitimate market participants from trading. The
CFTC is committed to prosecuting this conduct and is actively co-operating with
regulators around the world in this endeavour").
8. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C)(2014); see also Biremis Corp., Exchange Act Release
No. 34-68456, 2012 WL 658720, at *2 (Dec. 18, 2012).
9. See Adler, supra note 1, at 171-72, for an additional example of spoofing.
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Trader C places 500 sell orders at $10.01, which is just above the market
price. Because this $10.01 order is above the market price, no buyers will
fill the order. However, this increase in supply will ultimately result in
decreased demand, which will cause the market price to drop.' 0 This
means that competitors will lower the price at which they are willing to sell
shares from the previous market price of $10 to $9. Consequently, Trader
C's initial buy order of one hundred shares at $9 will execute. Happy that
he was able to successfully buy at such a low price, Trader C will then
cancel the 500 sell orders, the market will correct itself, and the market
price will return to $10 per share. If Trader C wants to be especially
deceptive, he can then sell the 100 shares that he previously purchased for
$9 per share at $10 per share, which would result in a profit of $100.
Spoofing is not a "vanishingly small or infrequent practice."'" In fact,
each week, numerous complaints are filed alleging spoofing trading
practices.' 2 The problem, however, is that the definition of spoofing is not
clear.' 3 Specifically, the mens rea requirement of "intent to cancel the bid
or offer before execution" is problematic.' 4  The inherent difficulty in
proving intent, paired with the fact that almost ninety percent of trades are
cancelled as a result of legal trade practices, could result in confusion and
legal trading practices being mistaken for and classified as spoofing.15 Due
to the forecasted increase in enforcement actions against spoofers, this
ambiguity in the anti-spoofing statute could lead to major problems.' 6
In the first criminal spoofing case, United States v. Coscia,17 a district
10. Adolph Lowe, A Reconsideration of the Law of Supply and Demand, 9 Soc.
RES. 431, 433-434 (Nov. 1942).
11. Andrew M. Harris & Matthew Leising, Market Manipulation Complaints Are
Common But Prosecutions Rare, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/market-manipulation-complaint
s-are-common-but-prosecutions-rare.
12. Id.
13. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Mem. at 7-8, United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d
653 (N.D. 11. 2015) (No. 14 CR. 551, 2014 WL 11210343 [hereinafter "Coscia Mot. to
Dismiss Mem."] (quoting CFTC roundtable participants. Gary Dewaal, General
Counsel of Newedge USA LLC, stated that he was "not sure [i]f the definition of
spoofing can be agreed upon by the ten people around [the] table." Similarly, Gregory
Mocek, former-CFTC Director of Enforcement, asserted that he was "not quite sure [he
knew] what spoofing [was].").
14. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2014).
15. See Jesse Westbrook, SEC Weighs High-Frequency Trading Rules After
Plunge, BLOOMBERG (Sept, 7, 2010) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-
09-07/sec-weighs-highfrequency-trading-rules-after-plunge-update 1.
16. Joseph De Simone et al., Expect Increasing Scrutiny of High-Frequency
Trading, LAW360 (June 4, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/544458/
expect-increasing-scrutiny-of-high-frequency-trading; see also Geiger, infra note 72.
17. 100 F. Supp. 3d 653 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
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court held that the anti-spoofing statute is not void for vagueness as applied
to the defendant, Michael Coscia.1 8 Coscia was convicted of six counts of
spoofing for utilizing computer programs to place and then immediately
cancel large orders to create a false impression of the number of contracts
available and fraudulently induce others to react to the deceptive market
information that he created.19 However, what if there are some situations in
which the spoofing statute is impermissibly vague? Is it possible that this
vagueness could result in legal trading practices being mistaken for and
classified as spoofing?
To answer these questions, this Comment will begin by offering a brief
history of the anti-spoofing statute to show how it came to be what it is
today. In doing so, it will explain exactly what spoofing is and its impact
on not only financial markets but also on business as well. Next, this
Comment will examine the situations in which the anti-spoofing statute
may be considered impermissibly vague. To do this, it will first explain
what constitutes impermissible vagueness and examine other criminal
statutes that have been challenged as impermissibly vague. It will apply
this analysis specifically to spoofing and argue that in the context of Fill or
Kill ("FOK") orders and pinging, the anti-spoofing statute is impermissibly
vague. In light of these problems, this Comment will recommend that the
"is of the character of' spoofing provision of the anti-spoofing statute be
removed and that Congress adopt a new definition for spoofing.
II. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ANTI-SPOOFING STATUTE AND
WHY IT MATTERS
A. A Look Back in Time: Spoofing Pre-Dodd-Frank Act
Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") penalized spoofing through two
CEA provisions, Section 4c(a)(2)(B) and Section 9(a)(2).2 °  Section
4c(a)(2)(B) made it unlawful to "offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm
the execution of a transaction" that "is used to cause any price to be
reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona-fide price."
2 1
18. Id. at 656, 659.
19. Id. at 653-55.
20. D. Deniz Aktas, Developments In Banking and Financial Law: 2013: X.
Spoofing, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 89 (2013); see also Matthew F. Kluchenek &
Jacob L. Kahn, Deterring Disruption in the Derivatives Markets: A Review of the
CFTC's New Authority Over Disruptive Trading Practices, HARv. Bus. L. REV.
ONLINE, 120, 130-32 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Kluch
enek Deterring-Disruption.pdf (arguing that pre-Dodd-Frank Act, spoofing did not
have the clearest history of enforcement).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (2014).
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Section 9(a)(2) prohibited a trader from causing the transmission of "false
or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any
commodity in interstate commerce."22
For example, in Bunge Global Markets,23 the government charged
traders with entering orders for soybean futures contracts in the pre-open
session24 for the sole purpose of determining the depth of support for
soybean futures at specific price levels a5 While the court did not explicitly
classify the trading activity as spoofing, it found that the traders clearly
were attempting to spoof the market.26  The traders entered electronic
orders for soybean futures contracts with no intention of allowing the
orders to be executed, and they ultimately cancelled them prior to open.27The traders moved the Indicative Opening Price 28 by entering orders above
or below the prevailing bid or offer.29  The court found that by placing
these orders, the traders caused prices to be reported that were not "true and
bona fide" in violation of Section 4c(a)(2)(B). 30 Furthermore, the traders
violated Section 9(a)(2) because the orders constituted false, misleading, or
knowingly inaccurate reports concerning market information that affected
or tended to affect the price of soybeans. 3'
B. Spoofing Today
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.32 The Dodd-Frank Act's
22. Id.
23. CFTC No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346 (CFTC Mar. 22, 2011).
24. Pre-open session refers to the period of activity that occurs before the regular
market session regularly begins. During this period, traders usually watch the market to
determine which direction the market will move during the regular session. Pre-
Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/premarket.asp (last
visited Apr. 3, 2016).
25. Bunge Global Markets, CFTC No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346, at *2-3.
26. See id; see also Aktas, supra note 20, at 91; Clifford C. Histed, A Look at the
1st Criminal 'Spoofing' Prosecution: Part 1, LAW 360 n.17 (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:01 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/645167/a-look-at-the- 1 st-criminal-spoofing-prosecutio
n-part- 1.
27. Bunge Global Markets, CFTC No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346, *1, *3-5.
28. The Indicative Opening Price is the "probable price at which the market will
open or re-open, given the current book and order activity," which is calculated based
on orders in the book during the pre-open session. Indicative Opening Price, CME
GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/confluence/display/EPICSANDBOX/Indicative+O
pening+Price (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
29. Bunge Global Markets, CFTC No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346, *3.
30. Id. at *8.
31. Id. at *9.
32. Aktas, supra note 20, at 89; Histed, supra note 26, at 3 (stating the Dodd-
Frank Act became effective in July 2011).
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primary function was to introduce various new reforms for regulating the
financial industry and to create new federal crimes related to fraud and
misrepresentation made by individuals engaging in derivatives trading,
futures contracts, and swaps. 33 Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act amended
Section 4c(a) of the CEA to add three types of prohibited transactions that
were "disruptive of fair and equitable trading." 34 These additions gave the
CFTC a "bigger arsenal of weapons" to fight disruptive trading practices.
35
Included in this "arsenal" is the anti-spoofing statute.36  This statute
prohibits individuals from engaging in any conduct that "is, is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, 'spoofing'."
37
However, the new anti-spoofing statute gave birth to confusion and fear
that the anti-spoofing statute would capture legal trading behavior.3 8 As a
result, in 2013, the CFTC offered guidance on which activities it would
classify as spoofing. 39 The CFTC emphasized that "legitimate, good-faith
cancellation or modification of orders" would not constitute spoofing.40 It
then provided four specific examples of acts that would constitute spoofing,
including
(i) Submitting or cancelling bids or offers to overload the quotation
system of a registered entity;
(ii) Submitting or cancelling bids or offers to delay another person's
execution of trades;
(iii) Submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an
appearance of false market depth; and
(iv) Submitting or cancelling bids or offers with intent to create
artificial price movements upwards or downwards.
41
The CFTC stated that to distinguish between legitimate trading and
spoofing, it would examine the market context, the person's trading
33. Jennifer G. Chawla, Comment, Criminal Accountability and Wall Street
Executives: Why the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short, 44 SETON
HALL L. REV. 937, 951 (2014).
34. Kluchenek, supra note 20, at 120.
35. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Matthew Leising, Market
Cops Got Power to Pursue Spoofers After Years of Failure, BLOOMBERG (May 14,
2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-14/market-cops-
got-power-to-pursue-spoofers-after-years-of-failure (quoting former CFTC
Commissioner Jill Sommers saying that "[e]veryone on the commission, including
myself, agreed we needed broader authority in this area"... [the goal was] "to not
have such a high bar when it came to proving manipulation").
36. See Kluchenek, supra note 20.
37. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2014).
38. See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31890, 31896 (May 28,
2013).
39. See generally id.
40. Id. at 31896.
41. Id.
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activity, and other relevant facts and circumstances. It is also interesting
to note that the CEA does not require a pattern of activity; rather, a single
instance of trading activity can violate the CEA so long as that "activity is
conducted with the prohibited intent.,
43
C. The First Criminal Spoofing Conviction: United States v. Coscia
Michael Coscia began his career as a commodity futures trader in 1998
and, since 2007, has served as the principal of Panther Energy Trading
LLC ("Panther").44 In 2011, Coscia "developed and implemented a HFT
strategy that allowed him to enter and cancel large-volume orders in a
matter of milliseconds. ' 45  Coscia used this strategy to create a "false
impression regarding the number of contracts available in the market and
fraudulently induce other market participants to react to the deceptive
market information that he created.' '46 As a result of this scheme, Coscia
reaped approximately $1.5 million in profits in less than three months.47
The government charged Coscia under the anti-fraud provisions of the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act"8 and the anti-spoofing statute.49
After unsuccessfully challenging the anti-spoofing statute for being too
vague, the jury ultimately convicted Coscia of six counts of spoofing.5 °
D. Spoofing's Impact on Financial Markets and Business
On May 6, 2010, the E-mini Standard & Poor's ("E-mini S&P")
market 5' dramatically plummeted, causing steep declines in other
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
45. Id. at 655.
46. Id.; see also Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL
3817473, at *2-3 (July 22, 2013) (stating that Coscia's strategy sought to give the
market the false impression that there was significant buying interest, which suggested
that prices would soon rise, thus raising the likelihood that other market participants
would buy the orders that Coscia was offering to sell); Brian Louis & Janan Hanna,
Swift Guilty Verdict in Spoofing Trial May Fuel New Prosecutions in U.S.,
BLOOMBERG Bus. (Nov. 3, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-11-03/commodities-trader-coscia-found-guilty-in-first-spoofing-trial.
47. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 655.
48. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2014).
49. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 653.
50. Id. at 653, 658-59; Louis, supra note 46.
51. The E-mini S&P is made of 500 individual stocks representing the market
capitalizations of large companies and is the leading indicator of large-cap U.S.
equities. E-mini S&P 500 Futures Quotes, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/
trading/equity-index/us-index/e-mini-sandp500.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
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markets.52 The E-mini S&P market quickly declined three percent and
another 1.7 percent after fifteen seconds elapsed. Other markets suffered
declines of approximately five to six percent with some suffering much
larger declines.54 In less than thirty minutes, $1 trillion of securities market
556
values dissipated.55 Luckily, the markets were able to quickly recover.56
After a short time, it became clear that the deceptive and fraudulent
trading of one trader, Navidner Sarao, greatly contributed to this market
decline. 7 The government accused Sarao of utilizing a manipulative
scheme that involved numerous "aggressive" spoofing tactics, which
helped to precipitate a multimillion-dollar plunge in the value of U.S.
shares. 58 This event came to be known as the "Flash Crash" and serves as a
warning of the devastating impact spoofing can have on markets.59
To understand why spoofing is so problematic, it is necessary to
understand what futures markets are and why they exist. Futures markets
are markets in which participants can buy and sell commodities and their
future delivery contracts. Futures contracts are agreements in which both
parties agree to buy and sell a particular asset of specific quantity at a
predetermined price.61 Futures market prices are determined directly by
hedger and speculator demand for and supply of these future markets.
62
The two greatest benefits of futures markets are risk-shifting and price
52. Complaint at 8, CFTC v. Nay Sarao Futures Ltd., 1:15-CV-03398 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 17, 2015).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Hayden C. Holliman, Comment, The Consolidated Audit Trial: An
Overreaction to the Danger of Flash Crashes from High Frequency Trading, 19 N.C.
BANKING INST. 135, 135-36 (2015).
56. See Complaint, supra note 52, at 8; see also Charles R. Korsmo, High-
Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 524-25 (2014).
57. Complaint, supra note 52, at 2.
58. Id; see also Andrew Trotman, 'Flash Crash' Trader Navinder Singh Sarao
Was Worried 'People Will Become Aware of What I am Doing', THE TELEGRAPH (Sept.
3, 2015, 11:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/11843059/
Flash-crash-trader-Navinder-Singh-Sarao-was-worried-people-will-become-aware-of-
what-l-am-doing.html.
59. See Korsmo, supra note 56, at 526-27 (comparing the "Flash Crash" to the
"Black Monday" crash of October 19, 1987 in which markets fell more than twenty
percent in a single day).
60. Futures Market, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/def
inition/futures-market.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
61. Definition of 'Futures Contract', THE ECON. TIMES, http://economictimes.india
times.com/definition/futures-contract (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
62. Anne E. Peck, Futures Markets, Supply Response, and Price Stability, 90 THE
Q. J. OF ECON., 407, 409 (1976).
2016 269
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA wREVIEW
discovery. 63 Risk-shifting occurs when a hedger uses futures contracts to
64
shift the price of a risk to another. This risk arises because producers
have no way of knowing with certainty at the time they plant crops what
price they will receive for those crops at harvest time.65 Futures markets
help to eliminate this risk by allowing producers to sell output at a price
fixed in advance. 66 This opportunity to "hedge" increases social welfare by
enabling a more optimal allocation of risk.67
Price discovery on the other hand is defined as "the use of futures prices
to determine expectations of (future) cash market prices." 68  Price
discovery facilitates the allocation of resources by providing a basis for
producers' production plans and users' consumption plans.69  Price
discovery therefore helps inform those individuals making production,
storage, and processing decisions.70
Spoofing is problematic for two reasons. First, spoofing creates artificial
market conditions that benefit the individual spoofer's interests while
harming other market participants. 7' These artificial market conditions
include false prices, demand and output.72  Spoofers create artificial
demand when they feign interest in buying or selling at a certain price.
73
This artificial demand causes other traders to move the market in a way that
is favorable to the spoofer, which results in artificial prices in that market.74
Artificial prices interfere with the ability of futures markets to provide a
63. Linda N. Edwards & Franklin R. Edwards, A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Manipulation in Futures Markets, 4 J. OF FUTURES MARKETS 333, 344 (1984).
64. Kenneth D. Garbade & William Silber, Price Movements and Price Discovery
in Futures and Cash Markets, 65 THE REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 289 (1983).
65. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 344.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 345.
68. Jian Yang et al., Asset Storability and Price Discovery in Commodity Futures
Markets: A New Look, 21 J. FUTURES MKTS. 279, 280 (2001).
69. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 345.
70. Yang et. al., supra note 68, at 280.
71. Aktas, supra note 20.
72. Keri Geiger, How Spoofing Contributed to the 2010 Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG
Bus. (Apr. 22, 2015, 8:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-04-
22/how-spoofing-caused-the-2010-flash-crash.
73. China Market Manipulation Probe Targets Spoofers After Crash, BLOOMBERG
(July 30, 2015, 10:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-
31 /china-targets-spoofing-in-latest-crakdown-on-stock-manipulation [hereinafter
"China Market"].
74. Id. But see Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 348 (noting welfare losses
may not be very substantial because (1) artificial prices rarely last long and (2) people
using futures prices for planning purposes typically plan for a broader period of time,
which means it is unlikely artificial prices would be used for planning purposes).
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useful price discovery tool.75 When prices are incorrect, producers and
76
users of futures markets cannot accurately predict future prices. As a
result, businesses are unable to make correct managerial decisions.
Second, spoofing undermines confidence in the market.7 8 Spoofing may
affect the public's perception of the fairness of futures markets.79 This
false confidence-boosting could result in traders weighing the potential
losses due to a manipulated market far more heavily than the possible gains
from being on the right side of the manipulation. 80 As a result of this cost-
benefit analysis, traders might have more incentive to not participate in the
futures markets at all. 1  In fact, in China, many hypothesize that recent
declines in Chinese stocks are in part a result of increased spoofing and
82market manipulation practices. Decreased market participation could
serve to lower the liquidity, meaning that the futures markets would find it
more difficult to facilitate the purchase or sale of assets without causing
83drastic changes in that asset's price.
If investors lose faith in the markets, they will take business overseas.
84
75. Id.; see Keller, supra note 2, at 1466 (stating that there is little incentive to risk
capital in markets where pricing is uncertain).
76. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 346-48; see also Bradley Hope, As
'Spoof' Trading Persists, Regulators Clamp Down, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2015, 10:34
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-spoofing-traders-dupe-markets- 1424662202
(quoting Benjamin Blander, a managing member of a Chicago trading firm. He stated
that "spoofing is extremely toxic for the markets... [and that] [anything that distorts
the accuracy of prices is stealing money away from the correct allocation of
resources.").
77. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 346-48.
78. See Keller, supra note 2, at 1476 (emphasizing that HFT impacts investors'
confidence in the markets' ability to provide accurate pricing information and causes
the public to perceive HFT as propagating a rigged game).
79. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 350; see also Matt Levine, Regulators
Bring a Strange Spoofing Case, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:48 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-21/regulators-bring-a-strange-spoofi
ng-case (explaining that people begin doubting their ability to make money when they
are often caught on the wrong side of a trade).
80. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 350.
81. Id.; Brooksley E. Born et al., Recommendations Regarding Regulatory
Responses to the Market Events of May 6, 2010: Summary Report of the Joint CFTC-
SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 3 (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/acreport_02181 .pd
f.
82. China Market, supra note 73 (stating that while spoofing may have contributed
to recent declines in Chinese stocks, the main cause is probably a pullback by
leveraged investors).
83. Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 350-51.
84. Portia Crowe, Traders Have Been 'Spoofing' the Market and Now Regulators
are Finally Catching on, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2015, 4:13 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/what-is-spoofing-the-market-2015-4.
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The relocation of businesses overseas is problematic because investments
in financial markets increase the amount of capital in the economy of the
country where it is invested.85 When capital increases, labor productivity
and Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") also increase. 86 An increased GDP
results in rising output, which in turn results in higher wages and increased
employment. 87 Simply put, investment in financial markets results in an
increase in labor, productivity, income, and employment.88 If investors
lose faith in U.S. markets, they will take their business elsewhere. There
would be a decrease in capital and, in turn, result in decreased GDP, which
means less labor, productivity, income, and employment. 89 In other words,
if people lose faith and exit U.S. markets, the economy will suffer.
90
III. THE ANTI-SPOOFING STATUTE IS STILL IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE IN
MANY CONTEXTS
A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provide avenues for anyone to challenge "vague" laws.91 A
law can be void for vagueness if it "fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement., 92  The
"void for vagueness" doctrine helps prevent innocent people from
becoming trapped by laws that do not provide fair warning.93 The
Constitution does not permit Congress to "set a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders, and [it] leave[s] it to the courts to step inside and say
85. Mack Ott, Foreign Investment in the United States, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/ForeignlnvestmentintheUnitedStates.
html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (stating that capital includes equipment, buildings,
land, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and goodwill).
86. Id.
87. Id. (explaining that approximately two-thirds of GDP goes to labor as wages,
salaries, and fringe benefits).
88. Id.
89. See id. (explaining the benefits of foreign investments on the host economy).
90. See id.
91. Elisabeth M. Gillooly, Comment, Larouche v. Kezer: A Cursory Look at
Connecticut's Hopelessly Vague Media Recognition Statute, 15 QU1NNIPIAC L. REv.
269,279-80 (1995).
92. Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 255, 257 (2010)
(citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
93. Robert H. Wright, Today's Scandal Can be Tomorrow's Vogue: Why Section
2(a) of the Lanham Act is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 48 How. L.J. 659,
664 (2005) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
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who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large., 94
However, when the government must prove intent, these requirements
"do much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the
[statute] would be so unfair that it must be held invalid., 95 A requirement
of scienter mitigates a statute's vagueness by ensuring that only those
aware of their unlawful conduct face punishment. 96 That is not to say that
it is impossible to raise such a challenge when the government must prove
intent; rather, there is just an especially heavy burden to succeed on such
challenges.
97
One must examine vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve
First Amendment freedoms in the light of facts of the case at hand. 98 The
following cases examine situations in which statutes have succeeded under
the void for vagueness doctrine.
i. Statutes Deemed Impermissibly Vague
Courts have held that statutes are impermissibly vague when there is no
clear definition of the proscribed conduct.99 For example, in Stoller v.
CFTC,00  the government charged Stoller with placing virtually
simultaneous sale and repurchase transactions at substantially the same
price. 101 The CFTC alleged that these trades constituted "wash sales" that
fell within the prohibitory language of Section 4c(a)(2)(A) of the CEA.1 0 2
The court held that the statute was impermissibly vague because the term
"wash sale" was not defined in the CEA, in any applicable regulations, or
in any interpretive releases.
10 3
94. United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999)).
95. United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations
omitted).
96. United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988).
97. See, e.g., Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding the statute to
be impermissibly vague despite the fact that the statue had an intent requirement).
98. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); accord Coscia, 100 F.
Supp. 3d at 658 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999)) ("Because First
Amendment rights are not at stake, the Court must assess whether the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to Coscia's conduct... [and] not to the conduct of the
'hypothetically legitimate traders' who voiced concerns about the [anti-spoofing]
statute's applicability ....").
99. See generally Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
100. Id.
101. Id. at264.
102. Id. at 262-63; see also 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(2)(A) (2014) (prohibiting a transaction
that "is, of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, a 'wash sale' or
'accommodation trade,' or is a fictitious sale").
103. Stoller, 834 F.2d at 265 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(2)(A)(i)) (stating that a
transaction that "is, of the character or, or is commonly known ... as, a 'wash sale' is
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Additionally, when statutes are not so well defined that they can be
interpreted to encompass other acts, courts have also found those statutes to
be impermissibly vague. 10 4  In Balthazar v. Superior Court of
Massachusetts,10 5 the court held that a Massachusetts law prohibiting
"unnatural and lascivious acts" was impermissibly vague in the context of
the fellatio and oral-anal contact that the petitioner was alleged to have
had.'0 6 The court held that there was a diversity of conduct that could
conceivably fall under the terms "unnatural" and "lascivious."'
0 7
Additionally, because there are acts that are less natural and more
universally condemned than the acts of the petitioner, the petitioner could
have reasonably believed that the statute was aimed at acts other than his
own.'0 8 As a result, the court found that this statute was vague as applied
to the petitioner.'
0 9
When the language of a statute itself is not obviously unclear, a statute
may still be impermissibly vague if it does not provide a standard for
enforcement. 1 0 In Chicago v. Morales,"'I the court found an ordinance-
that prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one
another or with another person in any public place- to be impermissibly
vague. 1 12 The court stated that the uncertainty did not arise because of the
prohibited and not providing an actual definition of wash sale); see also D.C. v. City of
St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding an ordinance that prohibited cross-
dressing and indecent or lewd conduct to be impermissibly vague because the language
was too vague to enforce when the ordinance did not define those words, and decisions
of Missouri state courts failed to constitute narrow judicial interpretation).
104. See generally Balthazar v. Superior Court of Mass., 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir.
1978); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 621 (1971) (holding that the
ordinance was impermissibly vague when it was so imprecise that no standard of
conduct was specified and that it therefore encompassed many types of conduct).
105. 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978).
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 272, § 35 (West 2016) ("Whoever commits any
unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall be punished by a fine.., or by
imprisonment."); see also Balthazar, 573 F.2d at 699 (stating the principal witness
testified that she performed "an act of fellatio and put her tongue on petitioner's
backside").
107. Balthazar, 573 F.2d at 701.
108. Id. (providing the example of "a range of sado-masochistic behavior").
109. Id. at 702.
110. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999); see also Cunney v. Bd. of Tr.
of Grand View, 660 F.3d 612, 622 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a zoning law impermissibly
vague when the law clearly demonstrated that a reasonable enforcement officer could
interpret the law differently, and, as a result, the law provided enforcement officers
with the "unfettered latitude" in making compliance determinations).
111. 527 U.S.41 (1999).
112. Id. at 45-46; see also Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992) (stating that
whenever a police officer reasonably believes a criminal street gang member is
loitering in a public place, the police officer should order him or her to disperse and
that if the gang member fails to comply, he or she will be in violation of the ordinance).
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normal meaning of "loitering" but rather which loitering the ordinance
covered."13 The court held that the statute failed to distinguish between
innocent conduct and conduct threatening harm.' 14  Therefore, the
ordinance was vague "not in the sense that it require[d] a person to conform
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct [had been] specified at
all." ' 15 As a result, the ordinance provided police officers with absolute
discretion to determine which activities constitute loitering."
6
In cases in which the government must prove intent, it is much more
difficult to succeed on a vagueness challenge." 17 However, in two cases,
courts held the statutes were impermissibly vague despite the fact that the
statutes had an intent requirement. In Kramer v. Price,"8 the court held
that the intent element did not save a statute from vagueness when both the
conduct that must be motivated by intent and the standard by which that
conduct also remains vague. 119 Similarly, in Record Head Corp. v.
Sachan, 12 an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the court held a
drug paraphernalia ordinance with an intent requirement to be
impermissibly vague. 2  While the ordinance enumerated various factors
one should consider, none of those factors helped to define the necessary
intent.122 Further, the factors, which were both "general and unweighted,"
seemed to exacerbate the vagueness by inviting inquiry into areas of
doubtful relevance rather than making the prohibited conduct any more
113. Morales, 527 U.S. at 57 (explaining that the definition of loitering in this
ordinance is "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" and asking how a
person was to know if he or she had an "apparent purpose").
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 61, 71 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The ordinance is unconstitutional, not
because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but
rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. And if every
application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited discretion, then the
ordinance is invalid in all its applications."); see also Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d
703, 712 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding the statute impermissibly vague when it lacked clear
guidance and left determinations to the subject judgment of police officers).
117. See United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988).
118. 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding Texas Harassment Statute, Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 to be impermissibly vague because it did not construe the
terms "annoy" and "alarm" in a manner that lessened those words' inherent vagueness).
119. Id. at 178 (holding that whatever the petitioner's intent may have been, if she
was unable to determine the underlying conduct proscribed by the statute, the statute
was impermissibly vague).
120. 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at678.
122. Id. at 677.
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clear.
123
ii. The Rule of Lenity
When a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires courts
to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.' 24  It is a tool of
statutory construction, which means that it "is to be used [only] to choose
between possible meanings if a statute is ambiguous, not to determine
whether the statute is ambiguous in the first place."' 25 The rule of lenity
provides that (1) fair warning shall be given to the public about what
constitutes a crime and (2) legislatures, and not courts, should define
criminal activity. 126
The touchstone of the rule of lenity is "statutory ambiguity.' 27 Under
this rule, a statute is not ambiguous merely because it is possible to
articulate a construction narrower than the articulation the government
urges. 128 Rather, courts reserve lenity "for those situations in which a
reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after
resorting to" an analysis of the "language and structure, legislative history,
and motivating policies of that statute."'
29
In United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,130 the court applied the
rule of lenity to resolve an ambiguity in the term "making" a firearm.1
3
'
The National Firearms Act ("NFA") provided that the term "make"
included manufacturing, putting together, altering, or otherwise producing
a firearm.' 32 However, the provision did not expressly address the question
of whether a rifle could be made by the aggregation of finished parts that
123. Id.
124. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014); Elliot Greenfield, A
Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) ("The rule of
lenity complements the vagueness doctrine by providing that when a criminal statute is
ambiguous, rather than vague, courts should resolve the ambiguity in the favor of the
narrower scope of criminal liability.").
125. Greenfield, supra note 124, at 14.
126. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also id, at 12 ("It is the
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.").
127. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
128. Id. at 103; see also Greenfield, supra note 124, at 15 (stating the rule of lenity
is only applicable if there is "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty") (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
129. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 109 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bifulco v.
United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)); see also United States v. Granderson, 511
U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (applying the rule of lenity when the "text, structure, and history"
failed to establish that the government's position was unambiguously correct).
130. 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
131. Id. at 518.
132. Id. at 509.
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one could readily assemble into a rifle. 133  The court rejected the
government's interpretation-that assembly is not necessary-in favor of
the defendant's construction that assembly was required. 34 In reaching this
decision, the court examined the language and structure of the statute,
congressional intent, and legislative history.' 
35
In the context of spoofing, if the anti-spoofing statute is found to be
impermissibly vague, courts will most likely apply the rule of lenity., 36
Otherwise, the broad anti- spoofing statute would not provide the defendant
notice of the charges against him or her.' 37 To reduce the error, courts
would adopt a narrower definition of spoofing to the benefit of the
defendant. 1
38
iii. Void for Vagueness Doctrine, the Rule of Lenity, and Coscia
In determining whether the anti-spoofing statute was impermissibly
vague, the court in Coscia undertook a similar analysis to those described
above. 139  Because the anti-spoofing statute includes a definition of
spoofing, the court easily distinguished this case from Stoller.140 The court
attempted to prove that the anti-spoofing statute does not encompass other
activities by distinguishing spoofing from FOK orders and partial fill
orders.141
The court, however, did not consider the issue of whether the statute
provided a clear standard for enforcement. 42 The court bypassed this step
because, in its view, it was clear that Coscia entered the orders with intent
133. Id.
134. Id. at510-18.
135. Seeid. at 513-17.
136. But see The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARv. L. REv. 2420, 2420 (2006)
(explaining that the rule of lenity has been applied inconsistently, randomly, or not at
all).
137. See ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME HORNBOOK SERIES: THE
RULE OF LENITY 17 (1st ed. 2013) ("A rationale for using the rule of lenity is that a
defendant should be provided with due process (notice) of the charges against him or
her.").
138. Id.
139. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656-59 (N.D. II1. 2015)
(determining whether the anti-spoofing statute was vague as applied to Coscia).
140. Compare id. at 658-59 (anti-spoofing statute contained a definition of
spoofing), with Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the CEA
does not contain a definition of "wash sale").
141. Compare Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 658 (ruling that spoofing does not
encompass other trading activities), with Balthazar v. Superior Court of Mass., 573
F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the law was impermissibly vague because it was
not defined well enough that it could be interpreted to encompass other acts).
142. See Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 658.
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to cancel. 143 This intent was apparent because Coscia frequently entered
and cancelled large-volume orders in a matter of milliseconds.
144
Furthermore, Coscia enlisted the help of a computer programmer to design
two computer programs, which helped him detect the conditions in which
his strategy would work best. 45 The court inferred from these trading
patterns and computer programs that Coscia placed orders with the intent to
cancel. 146  The court, therefore, did not have to consider the issue of
enforcement because "[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others." 
47
The court also did not apply the rule of lenity.14  However, this non-
application is not clearly erroneous as courts often inconsistently or
randomly apply the rule of lenity, if they apply it at all. 149 Furthermore, the
rule of lenity applies only when a statute is ambiguous and, in Coscia, the
court found the statute to be unambiguous.
1 50
Assuming that the court in this instance was correct, are there other
instances in which courts may find the anti-spoofing statute impermissibly
vague? To answer this question, the following section will consider
situations of the "hypothetical legitimate trader[s]" referenced in Coscia."'5
As demonstrated below, there are many instances in which courts may find
this anti-spoofing statute impermissibly vague.
B. How the Anti-Spoofing Statute is Impermissibly Vague
The anti-spoofing statute is problematic for four reasons. First, it makes
illegal any conduct that "is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to
143. Id. at 659.
144. Id. at 655; see also Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL
3817473, at *2 (July 22, 2013) ("In some instances, [Coscia] utilized the spoofing
algorithm hundreds of times in an individual futures contract in a single day.").
145. The two programs were "Flash Trader" and "Quote Trader." Coscia, 100 F.
Supp. 3d at 655.
146. See id. at 658.
147. Id. (quoting Vill. Of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)).
148. See id. at 655 (finding that the anti-spoofing statute was not vague in the first
place).
149. See The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 136, at 2420 (explaining that courts
apply lenity inconsistently, randomly, or not at all).
150. See Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 659 (holding that the anti-spoofing statute is not
vague); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (declining to apply the rule
of lenity when the statute unambiguously applied to the petitioner's conduct); see also
McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658 (1982) (refusing to apply the rule of lenity
when the present case did not raise significant questions of ambiguity).
151. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 658.
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the trade as 'spoofing'."' 52 However, the statute itself does not state
exactly what is "of the character of' spoofing. 153 As a result, this statutory
silence could arguably indicate that many legal trading activities could fall
under the ambit of the anti-spoofing statute or that enforcers would have
the broad discretion of determining which conduct constitutes spoofing.15 4
Second, the definition of spoofing itself is vague. 155  There is no
accepted meaning of spoofing in the futures markets. 56  As a result,
regulators can give the term any meaning.'57 Without a clear definition,
there cannot be a "clear line between lawful and unlawful activity[,]"
which means that an innocent trader cannot know exactly what conduct
actually constitutes spoofing. 1
58
Additionally, the statute does not specify whether the intent to cancel is
required to be present at the time the original order was placed. 159 The anti-
spoofing statute merely states that there must be "intent to cancel the bid or
offer before execution."' 160 In Coscia, the intent to cancel was present at the
152. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2014).
153. See id.
154. See Ronald Filler & Jerry W. Markham, The Flash Crash Case Against Sarao-
Will the CFTC Prevail?, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. Winter 2015, at 48
("[S]poofing in the context of cancelling orders conflicts with other permitted market
practices.").
155. Coscia Mot. to Dismiss Mem., supra note 13, at 10-11 (citing the CFTC Open
Meeting on the Twelfth Series of Proposed Rulemakings Under the Dodd-Frank Act 12
(Feb. 24, 2011)) (quoting former-Commissioner Jill Sommers stating, "[w]hen the draft
language of [the provision] was first discussed among Commission staff, it was my
view and the view of others [at the CFTC] that the language was too vague" and
former Commissioner Scott O'Malia referring to the statutory prohibitions as
"admittedly vague").
156. Kenneth W. McCracken & Christine Schleppegrell, The CFTC's Manipulative
and Disruptive Trading Authority in an Algorithmic World, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES
L. REP. Winter 2015, at 8 (Apr. 2015).
157. Filler & Markham, supra note 154 (explaining the history of the definition of
"spoofing").
158. Id.
159. Stacie R. Hartman et. al., Navigating the Thicket of Disruptive Trading
Prohibitions in the Commodity Exchange Act and Exchanges' Disciplinary Rules,
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. Apr. 2015, at 7-8. But see Bradley Hope &
Aruna Viswanatha, CFTC Charges 3Red with 'Spoofing' Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
19, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-charges-3red-with-spoofing-
scheme-1445275381 (quoting David Miller, a former New York federal prosecutor
who handled securities and commodities fraud cases, as saying, "[y]ou need to
demonstrate the intent to cancel those bids and offers immediately") (emphasis added);
Sohair Aguirre, et al., New CME Rule on Disruptive Trading Practices Summary
Chart, JD SuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/new-cme-rule-on-disruptive-trading-pract-21883/ (noting that The Chicago
Mercantile Exchange ("CME"), the world's leading derivatives marketplace, interprets
spoofing to mean that the intent to cancel is present at the time the order is entered).
160. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2014) (emphasis added).
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time the defendant placed his orders. 16 1 However, because the statute does
not explicitly state that intent must be present when the order was initially
placed, traders may be liable for spoofing if they initially place orders with
the intent to execute, but in a matter of seconds, change their minds and
decide to cancel the order.'
62
For example, consider a trader who places a sell order of 500 shares but
then quickly changes his mind and decides to cancel the order. In this
situation, the trader is not attempting to manipulate the market, but such a
large order will inadvertently impact the market, causing prices to either
increase or decrease. The trader may not have intended to at first cancel
the orders, but after he placed the offer, he then intended to cancel the offer
before execution for no outwardly apparent reason. So, while the trader
has the necessary intent, does such conduct fall under the anti-spoofing
statute? The answer is unclear. No other cases have addressed this issue.
This vagueness indicates that a legitimate trader may not understand
exactly what conduct falls under the anti-spoofing statute.
Third, the anti-spoofing statute is problematic because of the way that
regulators prove spoofing has occurred. In all previous spoofing cases, the
CFTC has heavily relied on circumstantial evidence of trading patterns to
establish an intent to cancel. 163 This practice exists because there is rarely
any other evidence that the government can use to demonstrate the
necessary intent.164 For example, in Panther Energy Trading LLC,165 the
CFTC relied on the fact that Panther frequently placed small sell orders at
or near the best price and then placed large buy orders at progressively
161. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 658 (N.D. I11. 2015) (holding
that Coscia entered large-volume orders that he immediately cancelled before they
could be filled by other traders).
162. See Matt Levine, Regulators Not Happy with Guy Whose Algorithm Tricked
Some Other Algorithms, DEALBREAKER (July 22, 2013, 3:41 PM),
http://dealbreaker.com/2013/07/regulators-not-happy-with-guy-whose-algorithm-tricke
d-other-algorithms/ ("If you put an order knowing there is a 98% chance that you'll
cancel it before execution, do you intend to cancel it before execution?").
163. Stacie R. Hartman et al., Disruptive Trading and the Search for Wrongful
Intent, 48 R. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 191,200 (Sept. 9, 2015) (listing factors that
regulators consider, which include: exposure of time of canceled orders, frequency of
cancelations, and the imbalance created through the orders between the volume on the
bid and offer). See generally CFTC v. Moncada, 31 F. Supp. 3d 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473 (July 22, 2013).
164. See Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed "Pinging"
and "Front Running" in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REv. 607, 666-67 (2015)
("Most individuals don't write an e-mail.., saying they intend to manipulate prices,
but that is currently what the law requires the [CFTC] to prove: 'specific intent' to
manipulate."); see also Hartman, supra note 163, at 201 (suggesting that traders
document the purpose of particular trading strategies to combat a spoofing charge if
one is brought in the future).
165. CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473 (July 22, 2013).
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higher prices that were ultimately cancelled to increase the likelihood that
market participants would buy the original small sell order as proof of
Panther's intent to cancel the orders before execution.' 66 However, there
was no other indication that the government used other means to establish
the requisite intent.167 Similarly, in CFTC v. Moncada,16 8 the court held
that "the most compelling inference one might draw from the trading
records is that Moncada was indeed trying to manipulate the market."'1
69
This reliance on trading patterns to demonstrate intent could result in
seriously discriminatory enforcement. 70 Many instances in which traders
frequently place and then cancel large orders may be mistaken for
spoofing. 171 In fact, such behavior is quite commonplace. 172 High-speed
traders cancel an estimated ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of their
trades. 73 Relying on trading patterns alone cannot distinguish between
these normal trading activities and spoofing.
The vagueness of the anti-spoofing statute along with its discriminatory
enforcement generally indicates that the anti-spoofing statute may be
impermissibly vague. The following examples look at specific trading
activities to further demonstrate how the current anti-spoofing statute
remains problematic.
i. Fill or Kill Orders
An FOK order instructs a brokerage to either (1) execute a transaction
immediately and completely or (2) not execute it at all. 174 The purpose of
166. Id. at *2-3.
167. See McCracken & Schleppegrell, supra note 156, at 8.
168. 31 F. Supp. 3d614 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
169. Id. at 616.
170. Lockwood, supra note 92, at 257.
171. See Ivy Schmerken, Spoofing and the Flash Crash - Six Things You Need to
Know, FLEXADVANTAGE BLOG (May 12, 2015), http://flextrade.com/spoofing-and-the-
flash-crash-six-things-you-need-to-know/ ("If you cancel repetitively, it could be
considered that you are manipulating the market ...."); Hartman, supra note 159, at 8
(suggesting market participants that anticipate frequently cancelling orders carefully
consider how regulators will view their cancellations and assess how strong an
argument they can present to show they did not have the requisite intent to cancel
orders before execution); see also Levine, supra note 79 (explaining that frequently
canceling orders is not necessarily spoofing because if a trader is "frantically clicking
his mouse all day," then cancelling is not necessarily a pattern but could just be
evidence that he changes his mind a lot).
172. See Hope, supra note 76 (quoting an alleged spoofer saying, "we are clicking
in response to what we are seeing. . . [i]f we click quicker than most, it is a skill").
173. Levine, supra note 162.
174. Patricia Chelley-Steeley, Noise and the Trading Mechanism: the Case of
SETS, 11 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 387, 391 n.6 (2005); see also David M. Weiss, III-B-
7-g Fill or Kill (FOK Order), AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SEC.
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this type of order is "to ensure that a position is entered at a desired
price.' 75  On an average day, 1.56 percent of all orders entered in the
market are FOK orders.
176
Coscia distinguished FOK orders from spoofing because according to
the court, traders place FOK orders with the intent that the trades be
consummated. 177 However, when a trader places these types of orders, he
or she intends the orders to be cancelled if the order cannot be executed at
the desired price. In other words, the intent the trade be carried out is
conditional. Thus, at the time the trader places an order, both the intent to
execute the trade and the intent to cancel the trade are present. Therefore,
under the anti-spoofing statute, these types of orders can qualify as
spoofing.
While the court in Coscia distinguished FOK orders from spoofing, such
a distinction may not be as clear in the real world.7 8  As mentioned,
enforcement actions have tended to rely on trading patterns as proof of
spoofing.17 9 Based on trading patterns alone, one could easily mistake this
activity for spoofing as both strategies usually involve large quantities of
stock. Additionally, the purpose of entering FOK orders is essentially the
same reason that traders spoof; traders want to ensure that they enter a
position at a desired price. Such a difference in the court's definition and
real world application could result in confusion among traders. While it
may be clear to a trader that he or she is entering a FOK order, to others it
may not appear to be so clear. As a result, traders could be left wondering
if they will be held liable for spoofing each and every time they enter this
type of order. Therefore, in this respect, the anti-spoofing statute is
impermissibly vague.
ii. Pinging
Pinging is defined as placing "small test orders at various price levels
TRANSACTIONS 153 (2006) (providing an example of FOK orders).
175. Fill Or Kill - FOK, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
f/fok.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
176. Elvis Jarnecic & Mark Snape, The Provision of Liquidity by High-Frequency
Participants, 49 FIN. REV. 371, 376 (2014); see also Rakesh Shah, Shares: Order
Types and Trading Dynamics, INV. CHRON. (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.investor
schronicle.co.uk/2011/1 2/06/your-money/shares-order-types-and-trading-dynamics-6gu
3bWPGZxzcVDVCE34cxK/article.html (stating that, in practice, FOK orders are
rarely ever used).
177. United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657 (N.D. 111. 2015).
178. See id. at 659 (stating that FOK orders are not entered with the intent to
cancel).
179. See e.g., id.; CFTC v. Moncada, 31 F. Supp. 3d 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See
generally Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473 (July 22,
2013).
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[and] immediately cancelling those orders that are not instantly filled."'180
Pinging is akin to using underwater sonar, "which involves the use of
sound waves-'pings'-to detect objects underwater."' 8' In pinging, a
trader will issue an order extremely fast, and if nothing happens, he or she
will cancel the order. 82 However, if something does happen, the trader
learns hidden information that the trader can use to his or her advantage. 
183
As with FOK orders, this type of trading behavior is permissible because
there is a chance that the order will execute before cancellation.'
84
However, traders immediately cancel the majority of these orders both
before and after the trade has been detected. 1
85
As a result, it is unclear whether a trader that is pinging the market may
be liable for spoofing under the anti-spoofing statute.' 86 Based off trading
patterns alone, pinging can easily resemble spoofing. In both pinging and
spoofing, traders quickly place and then quickly cancel orders.
187
Additionally, both trading practices may occur very frequently. Therefore,
based off trading patterns alone, it would be extremely difficult to
distinguish pinging from spoofing.
Once the government can establish pinging is "of the character of"
spoofing, it will then all come down to proving intent. Based on a Coscia-
type argument, one can distinguish pinging from spoofing because, like
FOK orders, pinging orders are entered with an intent to be consummated
and are only cancelled if no one bites.188 But, traders cancel a majority of
pinging orders before the trade executes. 89  This scenario raises the
following question: if you place an order that you are almost positive that
you will cancel, are you placing this order with the intention of cancelling
180. Scopino, supra note 164, at 613; see also Elvis Picardo, You'd Better Know
Your High-Frequency Trading Terminology, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/active-trading/042414/youd-better-know-your-highfrequency-trading-term
inology.asp (last viewed Apr. 11, 2016) (explaining that pinging is like baiting because
its sole purpose is to lure institutions with large orders to reveal their hand).
181. Scopino, supra note 164, at 613-14.
182. Id. at 622.
183. Id. at 612, 622; see also Filler & Markham, supra note 154, at 48-49 (noting
that pinging is used to determine if there is a trader on the sidelines seeking "a better
than existing market price").
184. Filler & Markham, supra note 154, at 49.
185. Scopino, supra note 164, at 616; id. (highlighting that more than ninety percent
of pinging orders are estimated to be canceled).
186. Filler, supra note 154, at 49 (asserting that there is a fine line between pinging
and illegal conduct).
187. See Scopino, supra note 164, at 616 (emphasizing that a majority of pinging
orders are cancelled).
188. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 659 (N.D. II1. 2015).
189. Scopino, supra note 164, at 617.
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it before execution? Again, the answer is unclear. Therefore, in the
context of "pinging," the anti-spoofing statute is again arguably
impermissibly vague.
IV. HOW TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF VAGUENESS
A. Eliminate the "is of the character of" Part of the Anti-Spoofing Statute
By its very nature, the anti-spoofing statute encompasses activities other
than just spoofing.1 90 The anti-spoofing statute makes it illegal to engage
in any conduct that "is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the
trade as 'spoofing'."'' 91  As a result, this statute explicitly allows for
liability for those trading practices that are similar to spoofing. However,
this statute and CFTC interpretations do nothing to clarify which activities
are "of the character of' spoofing. 92  As explained above, a statute is
impermissibly vague when it encompasses a broad range of activities so
imprecise that it specifies no standard of conduct.' 93 This part of the anti-
spoofing statute is therefore impermissibly vague.
Removing this part of the statute would limit the activities that this
statute proscribes. This removal would therefore make it more clear
exactly which activities fall under this category. The practice of pinging,
which shares many characteristics of spoofing, would no longer be under
threat of being illegal under this statute.' 94 Similarly, FOK orders would
clearly fall out of the parameters of the statute. As a result, this anti-
spoofing statute would no longer encompass as broad a range of activities
as it does today. Rather, it would only impose liability for activities that
are in fact spoofing.
B. A Better Definition of Spoofing
The definition of spoofing itself is impermissibly vague.1 95 Therefore, a
190. See Meyer, supra note 7 (quoting 3Red Trading's chief compliance officer
saying in light of spoofing accusations that "[t]he CFTC has oversimplified complex
trading and is now trying to classify legitimate trading and risk management as a
market infraction. We stand behind the trading at issue as it does not contradict
available guidance nor violate the law.").
191. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2014).
192. See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31890, 31896 (May 28,
2013) for the CFTC's interpretations.
193. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
194. See generally Scopino, supra note 164, at 648-50.
195. Coscia Mot. to Dismiss Mem., supra note 13, at 10-11 (citing CFTC Open
Meeting on the Twelfth Series of Proposed Rulemakings Under the Dodd-Frank Act 12
(Feb. 24, 2011)) (quoting former Commissioner Jill Sommers as saying "[w]hen the
draft language of [the provision] was first discussed among Commission staff, it was
my view and the view of others [at the CFTC] that the language was too vague" and
Vol. 5:2
REVISING THE ANTI-SPOOFING STATUTE
new definition of spoofing could help resolve all issues of ambiguity. In an
attempt to propose a better definition, this Comment will briefly explore
how other financial institutions define spoofing.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME"), in its new Rule 575,
provides regulatory guidance on various types of prohibited disruptive
trading practices, including spoofing.' 96 Rule 575 prohibits the type of
activity CFTC identifies as spoofing, but it provides additional guidance.'
97
Rule 575 states that "[a]ll orders must be entered for the purpose of
executing bona fide transactions" and that "[n]o person shall enter or cause
to be entered an order with the intent, at the time of order entry, to cancel
the order before execution or to modify the order to avoid execution."'
' 98
Among other things, the CME intends to consider the following: (1) the
market participant's intent to create misleading market conditions, (2) the
effect on other market participants, (3) the market participant's order entry
and cancellation activity, and (4) the changes in prices that result from the
entry of the order.' 
99
However, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") 20 0
takes a different approach.20 1 FINRA Rule 5210 states the following:
No member shall publish or circulate, or cause to be published or
circulated, any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article,
investment service, or communication of any kind which purports to
report any transaction as a purchase or sale of any security unless such
member believes that such transaction was a bona fide purchase or sale
of such security; or which purports to quote the bid price or asked price
for any security, unless such member believes that such quotation
former Commissioner Scott O'Malia referring to the statutory prohibitions as
"admittedly vague"); McCracken & Schleppegrell, supra note 156 (noting that there is
no accepted meaning of spoofing in the futures markets).
196. The CME is the world's leading and most diverse derivatives marketplace that
is comprised of four exchanges: the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. ("CME"), the
Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT"), the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"),
and the Commodity Exchange, Inc. ("COMEX"). About CME Group, CME GROUP,
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2015); see also Aguirre,
supra note 159.
197. See CME Market Regulation Advisory Notice, Rule 575, http://www.cme
group.com/rulebook/files/mran-ral516-5.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) [hereinafter
"CME MRAN Rule 575"].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. FINRA is "an independent, not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress
to protect America's investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly
and honestly." About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Oct. 22,
2015).
201. See FINRA Manual Rule 5210, Publication of Transactions and Quotations,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element-id=8726 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016) [hereinafter "FINRA Manual Rule 5210"].
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represents a bona fide bid for, or offer of, such security. 202
Even though it is not explicitly stated, FINRA's rule essentially prohibits
activities such as fictitious quoting, spoofing, and layering quotes.2 °3
Both CME and FINRA place an emphasis on whether the trader placed
the order for the purpose of executing a bona fide transaction.20 4 Because
the CFTC stated essentially the same thing in its guidance, it seems that a
part of spoofing is to enter into an order with intent to not execute a bona
fide transaction.20 5  Therefore, it would make sense to amend the anti-
spoofing statute to include this aspect. Additionally, it would also help to
clarify at what point the intent to cancel must arise. For this reason, this
Comment recommends that the anti-spoofing statute be amended to adopt
the CME's requirement that the intent arises at the time the time the trader
enters his or her order.
This Comment recommends that Congress should redefine spoofing as
the following: the act of placing a bid or order that, at the time of entry,
was not intended to be executed as a bona fide transaction.
This definition would solve all of the problems listed above with the
current definition of spoofing and help increase investor confidence. 0 6
Namely, because the recommended definition requires that the trader did
not intend to complete a bona fide transaction, it requires that the trader
entered the orders with the intent to manipulate the market in some way
20rather than just intending to cancel the order. 07 This newly defined mens
rea requirement would reflect that there was some type of bad intent rather
than merely an intent to cancel. 208 As a result, occasions when traders
innocently cancel orders would fall outside of the scope of this definition,
202. Id.
203. Equity Trading Initiatives: Supervision and Control Practices for Algorithmic
Trading Strategies, Regulatory Notice 15-09, at 2 (Mar. 2015), http://www.finra.org/sit
es/default/files/notice doc file ref/NoticeRegulatory_15-09.pdf.
204. See CME MRAN Rule 575, supra note 197; FINRA Manual Rule 5210, supra
note 201.
205. See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31890, 31896 (May 28,
2013) (emphasizing that legitimate, good-faith cancellation or modification of orders
would not constitute spoofing).
206. See Susan Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR
L. REv. 139, 194-95 (2006) (explaining that investor confidence increases with strong
rules); David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability For
Trademark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 35 (1998).
207. See Bona Fide, THE 'LECTRIC L. LIBR., http://www.lectlaw.com/def/b045.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (defining bona fide as "[i]n good faith; without fraud or
deceit").
208. Peter J. Henning, Conviction Offers Guide to Future 'Spoofing' Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/business/dealbook/conv
iction-offers-guide-to-future-spoofing-cases.html.
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absent proof that the traders are attempting to manipulate the market.
While this new definition of spoofing would help to clarify what
spoofing is and thereby eliminate the issue of vagueness, some difficulties
may still arise with this new definition. Most importantly, it still may be
difficult to prove that a trader intended to enter into a bona fide transaction.
However, it would be much easier to prove a bona fide transaction than an
intent to cancel.
C. What this Narrower Definition of Spoofing Would Mean for Business
When it is clear precisely what conduct is proscribed by the anti-
spoofing statute, traders can once again go about their normal trading
activities without fear that they will accidently break the law.20 9  As a
result, the markets will function as they are supposed to. Once again, the
futures markets will be able to serve their purposes of risk-shifting and
price discovery. 210 Price discovery will be more accurate as there will be
no artificial prices to prevent accurate prediction of future prices, which
will facilitate speculation and, therefore, make it easier to make managerial
predictions.2 1'
Additionally, a clear anti-spoofing provision could actually encourage
market participation by increasing confidence in the markets.21 2 A recent
Goldman Sachs Group study found that only eighteen percent of young
adults trusted the stock market and that sixteen percent said that stocks are
either too volatile or that the market is not fair.213  Such distrust is
worrisome as these young adults are entering their prime saving years and
they will soon become "the most important financial generation in
America. ' , 21 4  It is therefore important to rebuild confidence in these
markets in order to encourage these young adults to invest in U.S.
209. See Sec. of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) ("People
are entitled to know the legal rules before they act, and only the most compelling
reason should lead a court to announce an approach under which no one can know
where he stands until litigation has been completed. Litigation is costly and introduces
risk into any endeavor; we should struggle to eliminate the risk and help people save
the costs. Unless some obstacle such as inexperience with the subject, a dearth of facts,
or a vacuum in the statute books intervenes, we should be able to attach legal
consequences to recurrent factual patterns.").
210. See Edwards & Edwards, supra note 63, at 335-36.
211. See Yang, supra note 68, at 280; id at 345.
212. Susan Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 194-95 (2006) (stating that investor confidence increases with strong rules).
213. Callie Bost, Millennials Don't Trust Stock Market, Goldman Sachs Poll
Shows, BLOOMBERG Bus. (June 24, 2015, 2:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-06-24/millennials-don-t-trust-the-stock-market-says-goldman-sachs-poll.
214. Id.
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215
markets. Otherwise, the United States could face a severe "confidence
crisis," which could result in consumers delaying their spending.2 1 6 This
decreased spending and business investment could force the economy to
sink into another recession. 21 7 Therefore, it is vital that Congress quickly
restore investor confidence by refurbishing the anti-spoofing statute.
2 18
One way of fostering confidence in markets is to make clear definitions
of prohibited behaviors so that all people who want to be involved
understand the rules. 2 19  Clear rules also mean that the average person
looking to become involved in financial markets would no longer fear
being liable for a rule that he or she did not even understand in the first
place.22 ° Clear rules would create targeted, specific enforcement. In plain
terms, not only would the average person looking to become involved in
the markets be able to understand the rules, but he or she would also not
have to be in constant fear of accidently breaking an unclear rule.
According to Christopher Hehmeyer, the Chief Executive Officer of HTG
Capital Partners LLC, "[t]he market's desperate for clarity. . . the fact that
there's doubt creates confusion., 221  A clear and unambiguous anti-
spoofing statute would be a step in the right direction to providing clearer
rules and rebuilding confidence in the markets.
More confidence in the futures markets would also mean that "farmers,
ranchers, producers, commercial companies, municipalities, pension funds
and others" could continue to use the futures markets to "lock in a price or
a rate and focus on what they do best- innovating, producing goods and
215. See Ripken, supra note 212, at 194-95 (explaining that without a "broad-
based investor perception of legitimacy, people will not invest in the market" and will
instead put their money somewhere else, perhaps even just "under their mattress");
Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 712 (stating that when investor confidence in the capital
markets was at record lows, the average trading volume dropped by fifty-four percent).
216. Kenneth A. Kim & John R. Nofsinger, The Importance of Investor Confidence,
FIN. TIMES PRESS (July 4, 2003), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=98127
&seqNum=4.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also Mike Larson, Crisis of Confidence Latest Market Challenge,
MONEY AND MKTS. (Sept. 18, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/
crisis-confidence-latest-market-challenge-73405#.ViRYetbsVAI ("[C]onfidence is a
precious commodity. Once you lose it, it can be the biggest market killer of all.").
219. Franklyn, supra note 206, at 35 ("[I]t is generally recognized that clear rules
enable more efficient business planning which, in turn, should inure to the benefit of
society.").
220. See William Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking
How Choice-of-Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV.
491, 534 n.216 (2015) (noting that clear rules improve "the perception of the judicial
system as a fair arbiter of disputes"); see also id. ("The clearer the rule, the better one
can avoid it.").
221. Harris, supra note 11.
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services for the economy, and creating jobs," resulting in a better GDP and
122therefore a better economy.
D. Change is Hard; Reform Is Unlikely
Unfortunately, there is little political will to change the anti-spoofing
statute. Recently, the government has dramatically increased the number
of cases it has brought against alleged spoofers.22 3 This increase in
spoofing actions demonstrates that the government is confident that it can
succeed on spoofing charges with the anti-spoofing statute as it currently
stands. The Coscia case's guilty verdict-which came only one hour of
deliberation-furthered bolstered the government's confidence. 22 4  With
one successful conviction, regulators are confident that there are no
problems with the anti-spoofing statute as it stands.225 Absent a political
will for change, it is unlikely that legislatures will undertake the arduous
task of redefining spoofing.
However, the lack of political will does not mean that there is no hope
for reform. In light of the first criminal conviction and the clear vagueness
of the statute, market participants could start to become more invested and
push for a clearer definition.22 6 Additionally, in the course of spoofing
cases, the judicial process could serve to clarify what actually constitutes
227spoofing. These two forces could effectively work together to clarify
what spoofing is. However, until there is a clarification on the definition of
spoofing, government attorneys should practice prosecutorial discretion.
22 8
CONCLUSION
Recently, commodities trading activity, which may fall under the
222. Mission & Responsibilities, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResp
onsibilities/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); see also Ott, supra note 85.
223. See generally CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196 (N.D. Il. Dec. 18, 2015).
224. See Louis, supra note 50 (explaining the jury only deliberated for about an
hour before finding Coscia guilty of spoofing).
225. Lynne Marek, Three Reactions to Yesterday's Spoofing Conviction, CRAIN'S
CHI. Bus. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20151104/NEWS01
/151109918/three-reactions-to-yesterdays-spoofing-conviction.
226. Id. (quoting the President of the Futures Industry Association, Walter Lukken,
asking for more clarification about what spoofing actually is in light of the first
criminal spoofing conviction).
227. But see id. (quoting the Mr. Lukken as saying that clarification by enforcement
is not the best way to clarify a regulation).
228. See WAYNE R. LAFAYE ET AL., CRIM. PROC. § 13.2(a): THE PROSECUTOR'S
DISCRETION (3d ed. 2014) (stating that prosecutors can exercise their discretion when
(1) there is not sufficient evidence, (2) the costs of prosecution would be excessive, (3)
prosecution would cause undue harm to the offender, and (4) when the harm done by
the offender can be corrected without prosecution).
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classification of spoofing, has dramatically increased. As technology
continues to evolve and traders are able to place ever larger orders even
faster, there is a possibility that spoofing practices will increase even more.
However, the current ambiguity and vagueness of the anti-spoofing statute
could result in confusion as to what trading activities actually constitute
spoofing. Even worse, the government could prosecute legal trading
activities as spoofing. This over-prosecution could lead to confusion
among traders and could cause traders to stop trading altogether or move to
markets outside of the United States. For these reasons, Congress and the
associated regulatory agencies must clarify the current anti-spoofing statute
to resolve this problem of vagueness.
